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THE CORRESPONDENCE OF DUTIES AND
RIGHTS
For the purposes of this article Austin's definition of an act
is taken, a volitional bodily movement. The act comprises no
more than the movement of some part of the actor's body. Any
result affecting any other person or any thing due to that move-
ment is a consequence, not a part, of the act. In a wider and
often conveilient sense, an act is spoken of as including some of
the more direct and immediate consequences of the bodily move-
ment. Thus the act of firing a gun includes not merely the
bodily movement by which the gun is pointed and the trigger
pulled, but the movements of parts of the gun, the explosion of
the powder and the expulsion of the bullet. But in this article
the word will be used only in Austin's narrow sense, and the
consequence of the bodily movement, however direct, will be
distinguished from the act itself. The word act in the singular
number will, however, as is common, be used to denote a con-
nected series of bodily movements, e. g., the act of walking to a
place. Conduct includes both acts and omissions to act.
The law, however, never commands or forbids acts as such,
but only with reference to their consequences. A command to
do or not to do a certain act means to do or not to do some or
any kind of acts which will or may produce a certain consequence.
The act is defined by reference to its consequences. Suclh conse-
quences will therefore be called the definitional consequences of
the act. A command not to kill a person is not to do any sort of
an act which will cause his death; the death is the definitional
consequence of the act, though, as has been said, it is not a part
of the act.
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A legal duty is the condition of a person whom the law,com-
mands to da or not to do an act. The act is the content of the
duty. The definitional consequences of the act are the defini-
tional consequences of the duty. The duty is defined by describ-
ing the consequences which must or must not be produced. It
generally makes no difference whether we speak of a certain
fact or its logical contradictory as the definitional consequence of
a duty. Thus in a duty not to kill a man, either his death or
his life may be spoken of as the definitional consequence of the
duty, the consequence which will result from its being broken
or being performed, whichever is most convenient.
In a common law duty its definitional consequences are usually
such as will amount to violations of rights. Thus in the gen-
eral duty not to do negligent acts, the acts are negligent because
they will probably cause injury to some person or thing. Such
injuries are the definitional consequences of the duty. But in
statutory duties, and sometimes in common law duties, that is
not always so. Thus in a statutory duty to keep a highway in
repair, the condition of the highway itself is the definitional con-
sequence of the duty. Injuries to persons or things in the high-
way, which may result from disrepair, are reasons for imposing
such a duty, but are not definitional of the duty. The duty is
broken, if the highway is suffered to be out of repair, whether
any one is injured thereby or not.
The word right has various different meanings. There are at
least four distinct kinds of legal rights, which I have described
in Chapter VI of my work on "Leading Principles of Anglo-
American Law." Only one of them is important here, but one
of the others needs to be briefly mentioned to avoid confusion.
What I have in the above-mentioned place called a permissive
right is the legal condition of a person who is not subject to a
duty to do or forbear from an act. A person is said to have a
right to do or not to do any act which the law does not forbid
or command him to do. The act is the content of the right, as
in the case of duties. Some .most important of rights are of
this kind, e. g., the rights of religious liberty and free speech
guaranteed in the national constitution. Property rights are
partly of this kind. The owner of a thing may do what he
pleases with it; but a lessee or bailee may do some acts but not
others. A large part of the law of property is taken up with
descriptions of permissive property rights.
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The kind of right that is important for the present discussion
is what I have called a protected right. The ultimate object of
the law, the reason why the law commands or forbids certain
acts, is the protection of states of fact, either by preserving
them if they already exist or by bringing them into existence.
Thus at the present time I am alive and my body is in a sound
and healthy condition. My life and bodily condition are states
of fact now existing, which the law seeks to preserve. There-
fore it gives me rights of life and bodily security. In the case
of a creditor's right to receive payment of his debt, his posses-
sion of the money is a state of fact, which the law seeks to bring
into existence. A protected right is the legal condition of a
person for whom the law protects a certain state of fact. That
state of fact, not any act by which it may be preserved or
impaired, is the content of the right. The right is a right in that
state of fact.
If the state of fact includes the possession or condition of
a thing, the right is a right in or to the thing, which is called
its subject. But a right need not have a thing as its subject;
the right of reputation, for instance, has not. The fact of the
possession or condition of a thing, which is the content of the
right, must be distinguished both from the right itself, which
is a legal relation or status, the mere creature of the law, whereas
a state of fact may exist without any law and is not created but
only recognized by the law, and also from the thing itself which
is the subject of the right, a thing being different from a fact.
I take pains to mention these distinctions here, because some
critics of my above-mentioned book seem to me to have overlooked
them.
Any impairment of the protected state of fact I shall in this
article call a violation of the right. The reader will notice that
I am using the word in a sense somewhat different from its
ordinary one. The violation of a right in this sense is not
necessarily wrongful. To make it wrongful, it must be a con-
sequence of some breach of duty; but an impairment may happen
without any breach of duty by any one, as where a person is hurt,
and so his bodily condition impaired, by mere accident. That
would be a violation of his right of bodily security as much as
if it had been done intentionally by some one, but would not
be a wrong against him.
A protected right cannot be exercised, because the exercise
of a right must be by some act done by the holder of it, and no
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sort of act enters in any way into the definition of the right.
When the exercise of a right is spoken of, some other kind of a
right is meant, usually a permissive right. A person may do acts
to protect or enforce his own right, e. g., to prevent others from
violating it; but such acts are not in any proper sense exercises
of the right.
The law protects rights by imposing duties on other persons,
whose due performance will, or will tend to, prevent any impair-
ment of the protected states of fact. When a duty is imposed to
protect a certain right, it is said to correspond to that right
and to be owed to the holder of the right-this is not true of
duties imposed by the criminal law, which are regarded as owed
to the state. I omit the criminal law from consideration.
The questions: to what rights does a duty correspond, and to
what persons is it owed, are therefore at bottom the same ques-
tion. Sometimes it is more convenient to put it in one form
and sometimes in the other. Thus when it is said that certain
duties are not owed to trespassers, that means that it does not
correspond to any of their rights. But since the non-owing or
the non-correspondence depends not upon any peculiarity in the
rights of such persons, but upon the situation of the persons
themselves, it is more convenient to state the rule as relating
to the persons rather than to the rights.
Not all duties correspond to all rights. Of the various legal
duties, some correspond to many rights, others to but few. So
some rights have many duties corresponding to them, while others
have few. In other words, when the law commands or forbids
certain acts, though that is always to protect some state or states
of fact, it does not follow that such" acts are commanded or
forbidden for the purpose of protecting every state of fact which
might be affected by them, even though such state of fact is
one that in some ways the law does seek to protect. Nor when a
state of fact is one that the law seeks to protect, does it follow
that it must be protected against the consequences of every act or
omission which the law for any reason forbids.
When a duty corresponds to a right, it may or may not be
possible to break the duty without also violating the right, as
will be hereafter explained. A consequence of conduct which
amounts to a violation of a right, whether that be also a defini-
tional consequence of the duty or not, will be called a violative
consequence.
The elements of a wrong, i. e., a civil injury, are as follows:
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(i) There must be a breach of duty. A violation of right not
caused by a breach of duty is damnum absque injuria.
(2) There must be a violation of right. Without this a mere
breach of duty goes for nothing.
(3) The violation of right must be the proximate consequence
of the conduct that constitutes the breach of duty.
(4) The duty and the right must correspond to each other.
There may be a breach of duty resulting in a violation of a right;
but if the duty did not correspond to that particular right, there
is no wrong.
When there is no wrong because of the lack of correspondence
between the duty and the right, it is generally said that the viola-
tion is only a remote, not a proximate, consequence of the wrong-
ful conduct. This, I think, is an error. Want of correspondence
is one thing and want of proximateness quite another. They
depend upon very different principles. The subject of the proxi-
mateness of consequences is involved in much confusion and
conflict. Various quite different things have been put under it.'
When a complete wrong has been committed, for which an
action will lie for at least nominal damages, there may follow
further violations of the same or other rights, which are in the
nature of consequential damage. Damages may be recovered
for these in an action for the wrong, if they are proximate con-
sequences of it. But they are not a part of the wrong, but
extraneous and subsequent to it. Such consequences, though
they consist in violations of right, must be carefully distinguished
from the violation of right that is an element in the wrong itself.
In a particular case there may be no consequential damage, the
only violation of right may be the one that is included in the
wrong itself. Consequential damage of this kind will not further
concern us. It is mentioned here only to avoid confusion. How-
ever, the name consequential damage is often applied to the vio-
lation of right that is an element in the wrong, when that is
only an indirect consequence of the wrongful act, so that case
and not trespass would be the proper form of action. A right
whose violation may be recovered for as consequential damage
need not be one that corresponded to the duty broken. For
'I have discussed the subject of Proximate Consequences in the Law of
Torts in an article in the Harvard Law Review for November, 1914, and
have there distinguished the question of proximateness from various other
questions with which it is often confounded.
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instance, pecuniary loss, as will be presently explained, is a
violation of a right. But there are many duties that do not
correspond to that right, e. g., most duties to use due care. But
in an action for negligence, when some right has been violated
to which the duty did correspond, resulting pecuniary loss, if
not too remote, may be recovered for.
There are some rights which are protected only against specific
persons, the duties corresponding to which rest only upon such
persons, persons generally having no corresponding duties. These
are called rights in personam, i. e., in personam certain sive deter-
minatam. Such a right with its corresponding duty, the legal
relation, juris vinculum, between the parties was called in the
Roman law an obligation. The best example of this is a con-
tract obligation. The state of fact to be protected for the prom-
isee and the conduct of the promisor by which that state of
fact is to be protected, the contents of the right and of the duty,
are defined by. the contract; the parties make whatever sort of
a contract they please. The right is not protected against any
one except the promisor; no one but him is subject to any
duties for its protection. In cases where a third person is held
liable in tort for procuring a breach of contract, the iight vio-
lated is a different one, as will be explained hereafter. Obliga-
tions also arise out of various relations into which parties may
come to each other, usually by agreement. In such cases the
contents of the right and duty are fixed by rules of law, but
sometimes can and sometimes cannot be modified by the agree-
ment. Such relations, for instance, are those of parent and child,
where the duties are mostly imperfect ones not capable of being
the grounds of actions, master and servant, bailor and bailee.
Equitable rights and their corresponding equitable duties are of
this kind, though some equitable rights, e. g., equitable liens, are
not protected rights at all, and have no corresponding duties.
In the case of obligations no question as to the correspondence
of the duty and the right can arise. The obligation duty cor-
responds to the obligation right. However, in some cases,
especially of bailments of services, there is considerable conflict
of opinion as to what person should be considered to be the
obligee. The same is true even of contract obligations, when two
persons make a contract for a third person's benefit.
But some states of fact are protected against all persons;
rights in them avail against all the world, as the usual expression
is. These are called rights in rem-an inappropriate name, since
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they are not necessarily rights in things, and all rights areagainst
persons, not things. All persons are subject to duties correspond-
ing to such rights. Here some misapprehension has prevailed,
which must be cleared away. Since all persons have duties
corresponding to a right in rem, it has been mistakenly assumed
that all persons must have the same duties, and that therefore,
since there are no affirmative duties, no duties to do acts, which
rest upon all persons, duties which correspond to rights in rem
must be only negative duties, duties to forbear from acts. That
is not so. There are, it is true, certain negative duties of great
generality, which do rest upon all persons at all times, e. g.,
duties not to publish slanders or libels or not to do negligent
acts. But a person may come in various ways into certain situa-
tions out of which will grow duties to do -acts, to take active
precautions, for the safety of others or of their belongings, not
of specific persons but of others generally, so that the duties
correspond to rights in rem. For example, the possessor of a
dangerous thing may come under a duty to take precautions
against its doing harm to any other person or to any other per-
son's property, whereas a person who has not such a thing in
his possession is not subject to any such duty. But the rights
to be protected by such a duty, i. e., rights of personal security
and property, are the same rights which are to be protected by
the above-mentioned general duty not to do negligent acts, which
are rights in rem. Both duties are duties to use due care or dili-
gence to avoid the impairment of certain states of fact, which
the law protects against all the world by imposing duties, some
upon all other persons and some only upon persons whose situb-
tion makes the imposition of such special duties upon them
expedient.
The question of the correspondence of duties and rights pre-
sents difficulties only when the rights are rights in rem, and the
remainder of this discussion will be confined to that case.
There are four kinds of states of fact which the law protects
for a person, which form the contents of his rights in rem;
namely, (i) his own condition, (2) the condition of other per-
sons in whom he has an interest, e. g., his wife or servant, (3)
the condition of things of his, (4) his pecuniary condition.
(i) The right of personal security comprises the sub-rights of
life, bodily condition, liberty and reputation. There is no gen-
eral right of mental security. The law does not generally seek
to protect a person from painful or disagreeable mental states,
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such as fright or mortification. But there are limited rights of
this kind. In an assault, as distinguished from a battery, the
violation of right consists in the apprehension of immediate
violence. If there is a right of privacy, that is a right of mental
security. There is also what may be called an ancillary right
of mental security, whose violation cannot be an element in a
wrong, but may amount to consequential damage. When a tort
has been committed involving the violation of some other right,
and causes mental suffering, that may sometimes be recovered
for in an action for the tort.
. (2) Rights in other persons, who may conveniently be called
subject persons, such as wives or servants, will for convenience
be here designated by the name of potestative rights or rights
of potestas.2 These are rights in subject persons, such per-
sons being the subjects of the rights like things, and avail against
third persons. They must be distinguished from rights against
such persons, e. g., a master's rights against his servant to which
the servant has corresponding duties, which are rights in per-
sonam. Potestative rights may be rights in the services or reputa-
tion of the subject person, which have no corporeal subject, or
they may be rights in his custody or presence in a place or his
life, bodily condition or liberty, of which his person is the subject.
These last may be called potestative rights of security.
(3) Property rights are normal or abnormal; the former being
rights in corporeal things, the latter in incorporeal things. Ease-
ments in our law are classed among incorporeal things, which
is due to the influence of Roman law theories. The use of the
land is distinguished from the land itself and regarded as the
subject of the right. There is no sense in this. An easement
is really a right to use land in certain determinate ways. It does
not differ in its nature, but only in its extent, from the right of
a lessee or an owner to use land. In this article the rights of the
holder of an easement will be classed with normal property rights.
Property rights usually include permissive rights, the right
to possess the thing (jus possidendi) and rights to use it. On
its protected side, ownership or dominion includes the right of
possession (jus possessionis), the content of which is the fact
of possession, which is violated by any interference with the
possession, and a right in the physical condition of the thing,
which is violated by any change in that condition. Property
rights less than ownership include larger or smaller portions of
sPotestas in the Roman law included rights of this kind.
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the group of rights that are comprised in ownership. The holder
of an inferior property right may or may not have the right of
possession; and the physical condition of the thing is protected
for him so far as is necessary to the enjoyment of any right
of use that he has, but no farther. Any interference with the
thing that does not affect his ability to use it as he has a right
to do is no concern of his. Duties not to interfere with it
correspond to his rights only to that extent. For example: a
canal company granted to the plaintiff an exclusive right to
use pleasure boats on its canal. It was held that he could .not
have an action of tort against the defendant for using such boats
there, if the defendant's boats did not interfere with his. He
had only an easement, with no right of possession of the canal.
So far as the defendant's use was a violation of the right of
possession, as it was if unauthorized by the company, he could
not complain. It was also an interference with the physical
condition of the canal. In that the plaintiff had indeed a right,
but only so far as was necessary to enable him to use his boats.
His exclusive right, i. e., his right that no pleasure boats should
be used there but his, was an obligation right existing only by
contract between him and the company, which did not avail
against the defendant.3
In abnormal property rights in incorporeal things there is
usually a right of possession, whose content is some state of fact
that is spoken of as the possession of the thing. The exact
nature of the possession which can be had of purely incorporeal
things is a complicated and difficult question, which cannot be
discussed here. There is also usually a right in some state of fact
more or less analogous to the condition of a corporeal thing.
The value of a thing is no part of the content of property
rights in it. A mere depreciation in the value of a thing is
not a violation of the owner's property right. As will be
explained, that is a violation of a different right. But smells,
smokes, noises, vibrations and other such impalpable things com-
ing onto premises are in some cases considered to impair their
physical condition and violate the property right in them.
In a wide sense, which is convenient for many legal purposes,
the name property is made to cover many rights which do not
'Hill v. Tupper, 2 H. & C. 121, 32 L. 3. Ex. 217, explained in Nuttall
v. Bracewell, L. L i Ex. I, 36 1- J. Ex. i. See also Baker v. Hart, 125
N. Y. 470, 25 N. E. 948; Moon v. Mills, iI9 Mich. z)8, 75 Am. St. Rep.
390, 77 N. W. 926.
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come under the foregoing definition of property, e. g., contract
rights, which are obligations, or even pure permissive rights, or
potestative rights. This wide sense of the word is often applied
in construing constitutional provisions for the protection of
property. I am not objecting to it at all; but for the purposes
of this article, which deals with the correspondence of duties to
protected rights in rem, that wide meaning is excluded.
(4) There is yet another right in rem which has no name in
our law, which I have elsewhere called the right of pecuniary
condition. Its content is the total value of a person's belong-
ings, the totality of purchasing power which he holds.
Pecuniary loss to which a person is subjected is usually a vio-
lation of this right. The being deprived of purchasing power
or value which a person actually has, damnum einergens as the
civilians call it, is always a violation. Being prevented from
making a gain which one would have made, lucrum cessans, may
or may not be. If not, of course no action lies for such a loss,
and no question about the correspondence of duties arises.
4
In some cases pecuniary loss, amounting to a violation of this
right, is presumed. Thus the violation of any right imports
some damage. Every right is also deemed to have some pecuniary
value, so that being deprived of a right, which is a different
thing from the violation of a right, imports damage. So generally
does the being subjected to a new duty.
This right of pecuniary condition is usually confounded with
that of property, and violations of it are usually spoken of as
injuries to property. The differences between them are: that
the right of property concerns the possession and condition of
things, while this right concerns their value; and that property
rights are rights in separate specific things, so that a person
may have many separate property rights, whereas he has only
one general right of pecuniary condition, which relates to the
total value of all his belongings, including the value of things
which are not in the above-described sense property at all, e. g.,
of contracts to which he is a party.
For the purposes of this article the distinction between the
rights of property and of pecuniary condition is especially impor-
tant, because the correspondence of duties to them is very dif-
ferent. If any one objects to treating pecuniary condition as a
"I have explained the nature of this right in Chapter XI of my book,
Leading Principles of Anglo-American Law.
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separate right, and thinks it ought to be included under property,
still it is convenient to have a special name for that particular
kind or aspect of property rights, so that the question is merely
one of classification or nomenclature.
For convenience sake all those of the above-mentioned rights
which have corporeal subjects, including those rights of security
or postestas which have physical persons for their subjects, and
normal property rights, will be called corporeal rights, and rights
not having such subjects,- including mental security, reputation,
rights to the services of subject persons, abnormal property and
pecuniary condition, incorporeal rights.
There is no generally accepted classification or demarcation
of the duties which correspond to rights in rem; nor is it prac-
ticable to define them, so that they shall be mutually exclusive.
Duties overlap a good deal with each other, several duties often
covering the same ground, so that the same conduct may be a
breach of several duties. This is apparent, for instance, where
at common law the plaintiff could sue in trespass or case at his
option. Trespass and case lay for the breach of quite different
duties. Still, if we are to explain the correspondence of duties
to rights, it is necessary to have some idea of what duties exist..
The following description and classification is the one that com-
mends itself to me. Another person might prefer a different
one. No attempt will be made to define the duties exactly or to
point out the numerous exceptions to which they are subject.
Rough and approximate statements are all that is possible here,
and will be sufficient.
As a preliminary matter, it is necessary to describe a nuisance.
The word nuisance sometimes denotes a thing and sometimes a
wrong. In this article it will be used only in the former sense,
so that the mere existence of a nuisance is not necessarily wrong-
ful. A thing may have the nature that will bring it within the
definition of a nuisance, and yet no one be guilty of a breach of
duty because of its existence. Speaking roughly, nuisances are
of two kinds: harmful nuisances, which are things that, because
of their nature or situation or both, actually cause violations of
property rights, and dangerous nuisances, which are unreason-
ably dangerous to persons or property, though in particular cases
they may do no harm. Most duties in respect to nuisances are
for the purpose of preventing their existence. Of such duties
the definitional consequence is the mere existence of the nuisance
itself, not the harm which it does or may do. The likelihood
YALE LAW JOURNAL
of such harm merely furnishes the reason for creating such
duties. The duty is broken, if the nuisance exists, even though
it in fact does no harm, though in that case there may be no
tort, because no violation of right. But when the mere existence
of the thing which has the character of a nuisance is not wrong-
ful, or even if it is wrongful, the law may i~npose duties for the
purpose of preventing it from doing harm. Of such duties the
definitional consequence is not the existence of the nuisance but
the harm to be apprehended from it. Such duties are like the
duties of the possessor of dangerous things which are not
nuisances.
The definitional consequences of duties may be actual, probable
or intended. This gives rise to a threefold classification of
duties. For convenience and brevity in reference, the particular
duties to be mentioned will be numbered consecutively in Roman
numerals. Only common law duties will be enumerated.
(i) Duties of actuality are defined by reference to the actual
consequences of the conduct. The duty is to act or not to act
so as actually to produce a certain consequence. Usually in such
duties the definitional consequences are such as will be violative
of rights, so that, since the breach of duty is not complete unless
or until the definitional consequence is actually produced, the
duty cannot be broken without at the same time violating some
corresponding right. This is the case, for instance, in a battery
or a tortious taking of a thing. But sometimes, especially in
statutory duties, the definitional consequence is some intermediate
state of facts which may in its turn produce a violation of right.
For instance, in a statutory duty to provide fire escapes on a
tenement house, the presence, or absence, of the apparatus is the
definitional consequence. If no fire occurs and no one is injured
for the want of a fire escape, there is no violation of right and
no tort against any one.
The chief duties of this class are as follows: (I) Duties not
to do acts whose actual direct consequences will be forcible
injuries to persons or corporeal property, which duties are broken
in trespasses generally. (II) Duties not to commit assaults and
so put others to apprehension. (III) Duties not to take posses-
sion of things in violation of others' rights of possession. If
the possession so wrongfully taken continues, the act of taking
is sometimes deemed to continue. A' wrongful possessor of a
thing may be under a duty to restore it to the owner; but that,
it is believed, is an obligation-duty. (IV) Duties not to remove
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the support from land, and so violate a right of support. (V)
Perhaps some duties not to make nuisances by acts, or to abate
nuisances. (VI) Duties of possessors of certain kinds of actively
dangerous things, e. g., ferocious animals and in some places
artificial reservoirs of water,5 to prevent them from doing harm.
Most statutory duties and most obligation-duties belong to this
class.
(2) Duties of probability are defined by reference to the prob-
able consequences of the conduct. The duty is to act or not to act
so as probably to produce a certain consequence. Probability
means reasonable or unreasonably great probability, so that these
duties may also be called duties of reasonableness. Negligence
is conduct that is unreasonably likely to cause harm; therefore
these duties are duties to use due care, and may equally well be
called duties of care or due care. In this class of duties the
breach of duty is complete as soon as the act is done or omitted,
whether the probable consequences actually follow or not, though
there is no actionable tort until some injurious consequence
actually does result. Therefore a duty of this kind can be broken
without any violation of any corresponding right, or the viola-
tion may follow after an interval of time.
The chief duties of this class are the following: (VII) There
is a very general duty resting upon all persons not to do negligent
acts, i. e., acts which are unreasonably dangerous from their
tendency to injure persons or property.
There is no duty of corresponding generality to do acts for
the protection of others, to use active care or take active precau-
tions to that end. Such duties arise out of special situations
in which the actor is placed, usually in which he had voluntarily
placed himself. A person (VIII) who does an act which will
be dangerous to others or to property; (IX) who delivers or
furnishes a dangerous thing to or for the use of another; (X)
who has possession of a dangerous thing, or a nuisance; (XI) who
invites another to place himself, his subject person or his belong-
ings in a situation of danger, comes usually under a duty to
take reasonable precautions against the danger, if reasonableness
calls for precautions. (XII) Some duties not to make or to
abate nuisances, are of this kind.
(3) Duties of intention are defined by reference to the intended
consequences of the conduct. The duty is not to act with the
5Rylands v. Fletcher, L. R. 3 H. L. 330, 37 L. J. Ex. 161.
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intention to produce a certain consequence. These duties, like
the preceding ones, can be broken without the intended conse-
quence being actually produced, and no violation of right may
result, or it may follow later.
The chief duties of this kind are as follows: (XIII) Not to
act with the intention to produce a consequence which, if it
happens, will be a violation of a corporeal right. I do not know
how far this duty also covers violations of abnormal property
rights. Intention here means what I have elsewhere called simple
intention," a mere intention to produce the consequence. It is
not necessary that the actor should know of the existence of
the right. For instance, if A destroys B's chattel or enters upon
B's land, believing it to be his own, he is none the less guilty
of a breach of his duty. (XIV) Not to act with a culpable inten-
tion to produce a consequence which, if it happens, will be a
violation of any right of security (except the right of reputa-
tion), potestas or property. Culpable intention means (i) an
intention to produce the consequence, (2) knowledge of facts
which makes the consequence wrongful, but not knowledge of
the rule of law that forbids the act. For example, if A hires B's
wife, and thus deprives her husband of her consortium and
services and violates his potestative rights in her, he does not
break this duty unless he knows that she is a married woman.
But it makes no difference, if he knows that fact, that he believes
that he has nevertheless a legal right to hire her. His belief that
her husband had consented to the hiring would be an error of
fact.
Probably there is a duty not to act (XV) with a culpable
intention to interfere with ahother's business or (XVI) with a
malicious intention to cause any harm or loss to another. The
existence of the last-mentioned duty has been strongly con-
troverted. Both of these duties, XV and XVI, are subject to
many and important exceptions, which in fact cover more cases
than are left to fall under the duties. It is the existence and
wide scope of these exceptions which, as it seems to me, has
led to the denial of the existence of any duty as to malicious
acts. (XVII) Duties not intentionally to procure breaches of
contract. (XVIII) Duties as to malicious prosecution. (XIX)
Duties not to punish slanders and libels; (XX) and not to make
fraudulent misrepresentations.
'Leading Principles of Anglo-American Law, 212.
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There are a few other duties of intention of less importance,
which it is not worth while to take space to describe here.
As to duties of actuality and probability, the general rule is
that they correspond to all corporeal rights but not to incorporeal
ones. The question often arises when the right violated is the
right of pecuniary condition. Some examples of non-corre-
spondence are as follows.
The plaintiff contracted with a town to support its paupers
for a fixed sum per year. The defendant beat a pauper, whereby
the plaintiff was put to additional expense in caring for him. It
was held that the plaintiff had no cause of action against the
defendant. He had no potestative right in the pauper, and the
only right of his which was violated was the right of pecuniary
condition. The duty broken was that in I, which did not corre-
spond to that right. The court said that the damage to him was
remote. The duty in XIII was also broken, but, as will be
explained, that did not correspond to the right.7 So it has often
been decided that a life insurance company has no ground of
action against a person who intentionally or negligently kills one
of its policy holders, and thus causes it a pecuniary loss. Here
the duty broken might be that in I, VII or XIII.
The defendant negligently injured the gate of a dock owned
by a dock company, so that the dock had to be closed for several
days for repairs. The plaintiff's ship came to the dock to take
cargo which was waiting for her inside, but because the dock
was closed, had to wait two days before entering, which caused
the plaintiff a pecuniary loss. Held: the defendant was not
liable to him. If by a tortious act an inn is made unfit to receive
guests, a traveler who on that account cannot get entertained
there has no action against the tortfeasor.8 The duty broken
was VII, and the only right of the plaintiff which was violated
was that of pecuniary condition. The court said that he had no
interest, i. e., no right in the nature of a property right, in the
dock. Here the injury to the plaintiff was probable enough to
make it proximate, if the duty had been owed to him at all.
"Anthony v. Slaid, ii Metc. (Mass.) 290. See also Sin4pson v. Thomp-
son, L. R. 3 App. Cas. 279; Milton v. Story, ii Vt. 1oi, 34 Am. Dec. 671;
Brink v. Wabash R. R. Co., i6o Mo. 87, 83 Am. St. Rep. 459, 6o S. W.
io58. Compare McNary v. Chamberlain, 34 Conn. 384, 91 Am. Dec. 732,
and Tarleton v. McCawley, i Peake N. P. 270, where the duty broken was
XV or XVI, which does correspond to the right of pecuniary condition.
'Anglo-Algerian S. S. Co. v. Houlder Line, (1898) 1 K. B. 659.
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A negligent misrepresentation, without any fraudulent intent,
which causes pecuniary loss, is not actionable. Such a misrepre-
sentation is not a breach of XVIII, which corresponds to the
right of pecuniary condition. But if false information is negli-
gently given in a case where the negligence depends upon the
probability that physical injury to someone will result from it,
so that there is a breach of VII, and as the act in fact causes
such an injury, the actor may be liable for a tort, if the injury
is proximate.
There are some exceptions to the above general rule. The
duty in II corresponds to a right of mental security; IV corre-
sponds only to the right of support, which is an easement; and
some of the duties in V and XII, so far as they relate to certain
harmful nuisances, have been considered to correspond only to
property rights.
It has been held that a wife living in her husband's house,
who was made sick by gas which escaped from street mains into
the house, and was a nuisance, had no action against the gas com-
pany, because she had no property right in the premises.'
Duties of intention have a wider range of correspondence, and
usually correspond to both corporeal and incorporeal rights.
XIX, however, corresponds only to the right of reputation, and
is the only duty that corresponds to that right.
1 0 What is said
below as to the correspondence of duties of intention to all rights
must be taken subject to this. XIII corresponds to corporeal
rights, and perhaps, as has been said, to abnormal property rights,
not to other incorporeal rights. Perhaps in some cases, e. g.,
patents or copyrights, its correspondence is determined by statute.
In the examples above given of beating a pauper, this may have
been the duty broken. XIV seems to correspond to all rights
except pecuniary condition. As to corporeal rights it overlaps
with XIII, so that it is seldom necessary to distinguish between
the two duties, i. e., to attend to the distinction between simple
and culpable intention.
The proprietor of a registered design for lace goods contracted
with the plaintiffs to supply to them all the goods made by him
according to that design and to give them the exclusive right to
"Ellis v. Kansas City etc. R. R. Co., 63 Mo. 131, 21 Am. Rep. 436;
Hughes v. Auburn, 161 N. Y. 96, 55 N. E. 389, 46 L. R. A. 636.
'Hodgson v. Sidney, L. R. i Ex. 313.
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sell such goods. Held: they could not have an action against the
defendant, who made lace goods after that design aid sold them.
Only the proprietor of the design could sue."1 The duty broken
was XIV, which corresponded to the proprietor's incorporeal
property right in the design, but not to the right of pecuniary
condition, which was the only right of the plaintiff's that was
violated.
If A fraudulently uses B's trademark on his goods, with the
intend to deceive the public and injure B's business, and the
effect is to increase A's business and thus draw away trade from
C, a rival dealer who has no right in the trademark, that is not
a tort against C.' 2 A breaks the duty in XIV, but that does not
correspond to that jight. His act would be a tort against B,
because the duty does correspond to rights in trademarks.
XV, it is believed, corresponds only to the right of pecuniary
condition, unless there is a special right in the nature of an
abnormal property right in one's business, about which I do not
feel sure. If there is such a right, the same duties correspond to
it as to the right of pecuniary condition. XVI corresponds to all
rights. XVII corresponds to the right of pecuniary condition,
not to the contract right, which is a right in personam against
the promisor only. The non-performance of the contract is
deemed to import some pecuniary loss to the promisee. XVIII
and XX correspond to all rights. In a malicious prosecution
the right of liberty is often violated. A fraudulent misrepre-
sentation usually causes pecuniary loss, but it may cause a viola-
tion of some other right. Thus where a man was held guilty of
a tort for inducing a woman to have sexual intercourse with
him by pretending to be her husband, 3 her right of bodily
security or of privacy was violated. So if a person should induce
another to swallow a deleterious drug by a false representation
that it was a harmless medicine.
A husband may have an action for a fraudulent misrepre-
sentation, by which he loses his wife's consortium without any
pecuniary loss.' 4
' Woolley v. Broad, (892) i Q. B. 8o6.
"American Washboard Co. v. Saginaw Mfg. Co., 1O3 Fed. 281, 43
C. C. A. 233, 5o L. R. A. 6og.
"Price v. Price, 75 N. Y. 244, 31 Am. Rep. 463.
"4 Payne's Appeal, 65 Conn. 397, 48 Am. St. Rep. 215, 32 Atl. 948; KuJik
v. Coleman, i5o N. Y. 176, 55 Am. St. Rep. 67o, 44 N. E. 773.
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Correspondence is in genere or in specie.
Definitions of legal duties are generic definitions, that is, they
define kinds or classes of acts to be done or omitted, and as so
defined they correspond to rights of certain kinds or classes.
For example, VII covers all kinds of negligent acts, mid corre-
sponds to all kinds of corporeal rights. That is correspondence
in genere, correspondence between certain kinds of duties and
certain kinds of rights. That is the kind of correspondence that
has been heretofore spoken of.
Correspondence in genere may, however, be limited in its scope.
A duty that generally corresponds to certain kinds of rights may
not correspond to all of such rights, or what is the same thing,
may not be owed to all holders of such rights. Thus a statutory
duty to fence land, so far as that is for the protection of cattle
who may stray onto the land and be injured, i. e., so far as it
corresponds to rights in such cattle, is owed only for the protec-
tion of cattle which may enter from a place where they have a
right to be. So the duty in XI, though it corresponds in genere
to rights of bodily security, is owed only to invitees, not to tres-
passers or licensees even for their protection from bodily harm.
Perhaps, however, the question in such cases is not of a limited
correspondence but of a limited scope of the duty itself.
When there is a generalized duty to use care for a certain end,
and also a specialized duty by statute to take certain specified
precautions to that end, the specialized duty may not be owed to
all persons to whom the generalized duty is owed. Thus the duty
of a railroad company to run its -trains carefully so as not to run
over persons, is owed to all persons; but a statutory duty not
to run at more than a certain speed may be owed only to certain
classes of persons."x
When, however, a duty becomes operative, i. e., when the occa-
sion arises for performing it, it becomes specific, i. e., it takes
the form of a duty to do or forbear from some specific act,
defined by reference to some specific consequence. When a duty
becomes specific, its definitional consequences are specific conse-
quences of some kind which are generically definitional of that
kind of duty. For example, the generic duty in VII may in a
particular case take the form of a specific duty not to drive an
auto car dangerously fast in a certain street, defined by reference
" Western Ry. of Alabama v. Mutch, 97 Ala. 194, 38 Am. St. Rep. 179,
IS. 894.
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to the safety of persons or things which happen just then to be
in the street; or the generic duty XV or XVI may take the
specific form of a duty not to promote a boycott against A,
defined by reference to the effect upon A's business.
A breach of duty is necessarily of a specific duty; and if a
violation of right ensues, it must be a violation of some specific
right. To make a wrong it is necessary not only that the duty
and the right correspond in genere, but that the specific duty
broken correspond to the specific right violated. This is corre-
spondence in specie.
As has been said, the definitional consequence of a duty may
itself be violative of a right, or it may be some intermediate state
of fact which may or will in its turn cause a violation. It has
also been said that in duties of probability and intention, the
duty may be broken without the definitional consequences ever
actually happening; it is enough that the actor's conduct will
probably or is intended to produce them.
In order that there may be correspondence in specie to make a
wrong, some consequence which is specifically definitional of the
duty at the time when it becomes operative and is broken must
actually ensue as a proximate consequence of the conduct, and
the violation of right must either consist in that very consequence
or be a proximate consequence of it, the right violated being of
course one to which the duty corresponded in genere.
In duties of actuality the actual happening of any definitional
consequence may not be probable, foreseeable or intended; any
consequence of a certain kind is definitional. Therefore it is
usually not possible to distinguish between correspondence in
genere and in specie. If any consequence of a certain kind hap-
pens, there is a breach of duty. In Rylands v. Fletcher,6 for
example, where the possessor of an artificial reservoir was held
liable for damage done by the escape of the water, although that
was not due to any negligence of his, on the ground that his
duty to prevent such harm was a duty of actuality, the water
escaped in a wholly improbable and unforeseeable way, and the
property injured was so situated that there was no probability
of its being injured if the water had escaped in any way that
might have been anticipated, e. g., by the breaking of the dam.
As to I, it is still a disputed question whether the definitional
consequences, which must undoubtedly be actual, must also be
11 L. R. 3 H. L. 330, 37 L. J. Ex. 161.
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probable or intended, whether negligence or intention is neces-
sary to a trespass. If not, what is said above applies. Any
direct injury to a person or to property which is definitional of
the duty in genere is also definitional of it in specie. Even so,
it is admitted that the actor is not liable for an injury due to
inevitable accident, whatever inevitable accident means. But
that may be treated as an exception to the duty rather than as
bearing on the question of correspondence. If intention or
negligence is necessary, then the rules as to correspondence in
specie are the same as in duties of intention or of probability.
However there is some authority for the rule that, even if inten-
tion or negligence is necessary, a wrong intention or negligence
as toward any one, and not necessarily as toward the person or
thing actually injured, e. g., an intention to commit a crime, is
enough. If that is so, the intention or negligence is wholly
collateral to and has no bearing on the question of correspondence,
which stands as if no intention or negligence was necessary. This
will be illustrated by the example presently to be given of shooting
so as to endanger one person and hitting another.
If the definitional consequence is not the same as the violative,
there is a sufficient correspondence if the latter is a proximate
consequence of the former. As I have tried to show in my
article in the Harvard Law Review for November, 1914, proxi-
mateness does not always depend upon probability; an improb-
able consequence may be proximate. There is much conflict of
opinion about this. In such cases the question of correspondence
and of proximateness, though -usually distinct, coincide, and
correspondence depends upon the rules for proximateness.
The defendant washed his van in the street, which was for-
bidden by statute. The water ran down into the street and froze.
The plaintiff slipped on the ice and was hurt. The court held
that in the circumstances the injury was not a proximate conse-
quence, and the plaintiff failed.17  Here the definitional con-
sequences were complete when the washing was done, and the
violative consequences followed later and might not have followed
at all. It would make no difference, even assuming that the duty
corresponded in genere to rights of bodily security, whether the
decision be put on the ground of remoteness or of want of
correspondence in specie.
In duties of probability, the specific definitional consequence
must be probable.
"Sharp v. Powell, L. R. 7 C. P. 253.
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If A shoots in the direction of B, so that he will probably
hit B, that is a breach of VII toward B. The duty is owed in
specie to B, and corresponds in specie to B's right of bodily
security. But if C happens to be within range, so that the act is
actually dangerous to him, but A does not know that any one
is there, hitting him is not legally probable, because legal prob-
ability depends upon facts known to the actor; no one is legally
bound by a duty of probability to regulate his conduct with
reference to facts of which he is ignorant. Hence A's specific
duty not to shoot in that direction is not owed to C, and does not
correspond in specie to C's right, although in genere it is owed to
all persons. If C sues A in case for negligence, for a breach
of VII, he will fail. If he sues in trespass, for a breach of I,
then if to a breach of that duty intention or negligence toward
the specific person injured is necessary, as in duties of intention
or probability, the result will be the same. But if no intention
or negligence is necessary, or if collateral intention or negligence
is sufficient, A's liability will not depend upon any question of
correspondence, but upon whether the injury to C was an
inevitable accident, as has been explained above.
The defendants negligently set fire to a building of their own.
The fire spead to certain property of the plaintiff's and destroyed
it. Held: the defendants were not liable, because the spread
of the fire to his property-was not probable.""
The defendant negligently caused his horse to run away in
the highway. The horse ran along the highway to the defendant's
gate and turned in there to his yard, and there ran over the
plaintiff, who happened to be there on a visit to the defendant's
wife. The defendant was held not liable. The court said that
the defendant owed no duty to the plaintiff to use care to pre-
vent the horse from running away, because it was not probable
that any one in his situation would be injured, though the defen-
dant did owe such a duty to persons in the highway. 9
The plaintiff, a passenger by the defendants' railroad, was
standing on the station platform waiting for his train to arrive.
As the train came in, a woman, because of the defendants' negli-
gent omission to give warning of the approach of the train, got
upon the track and was struck and killed by it. Her body was
Barron v. Eldridge, IoO Mass. 455, I Am. Rep. 126.
" Tolhausen v. Davies, 57 L. J. Q. B. 372. See also St. Louis, K. C.
& C. R. Co. v. Conway, 156 Fed. 234, 86 C. C. A. i.
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thrown violently against the plaintiff, knocking him down and
injuring him. Held: the defendants were not liable. The only
duty that the company broke was a duty to give warning, and
there was no probability that the failure to do so would cause
harm to him. 20 Here the generic duty was XI, which was owed
in geizere both to the woman and the plaintiff. But when it
became operative and specific in the given circumstances, it took
the form of a duty to give warning.
If the probable definitional consequence is not violative, the
violative consequence must be the proximate consequence of the
definitional, as in the case of duties of actuality. Thus in XII,
the existence of the specific nuisance that is actually caused to
exist must have been probable, and the damage done by it must
be the proximate consequence of its existence.
The specific probability above spoken of does not necessarily
mean probability of injury to the very individual person or thing
that is injured. It sometimes has a wider scope. If there is a
probability that any person or thing in a certain place or situation
will be injured, and it is also probable that any person or thing
will be there, it need not be probable that the person or thing
actually injured will be there.2 '
If for instance, a person throws a heavy object from the roof
of a house into the street, when it will probably hit some one, and
it hits A, it makes no difference that it was improbable that A
would be there.
Also if the conduct will probably produce a certain conse-
quence, it makes no difference that it actually produces it in an
improbable way, through an improbable chain of intervening
causes.
Thus where A set fire on his land when it was unreasonably
dangerous to do so because of the probability that the fire would
spread to B's land, and it did so spread, it was held that the
injury to B should not be deemed improbable because the fire
followed an improbable course.2 2
There is perhaps one exception to the foregoing general rule.
If a person wrongfully sets in operation an active dangerous
Wood v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co, 177 Pa. St. 306, 55 Am. St. Rep. 728,
35 AtI. 699.
2 Tolhausen v. Davies, 57 L. J. Q. B. 392. See also Yoders v. Amwell,
172 Pa. St. 447, 33 AtI. 10,7.
SHiggins v. Dewey, 1o7 Mass. 494.
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agency, which has a tendency to extend the scope of its action,
and it extends further than was probable, it has been held that he
is still liable for injuries from it to persons and things outside
of its probable scope of operation. 23 The contrary has been held
as to fire.
2 4
In duties of intention the specific consequences must be
intended, and the duty corresponds in specie only to rights which
will be violated by or as a proximate consequence of such
specifically intended consequences as actually happen.
In the example above given of A fraudulently using B's trade-
mark to the injury of C's business, although A also breaks the
duty in XX, which does correspond to the right of pecuniary
condition, there was no intention to injure C.
HENRY T. TERRY.
NEW YORK CITY.
' Smith v. London & S. W. Ry. Co., L. R. 5 C. P. 8, 39 L. J. C. P. 68,
L. R. 6 C. P. 14, 4o L. J. C. P. 21. I have discussed this case in my above
mentioned article in the Harvard Law Review. See also Isham v. Dow,
7o Vt. 588, 67 Am. St. Rep. 691, 41 Atl. 585.
2 Barron v. Eldridge, ioo Mass. 455, I Am. Rep. 126, cited above; Mil-
waukee & S. P. Ry. Co. v. Kellogg, 94 U. S. 469, 24 L. ed. 256; Haverly
v. State Line & S. R. R. Co., 135 Pa. St. 5o, 2o Am. St. Rep. 848, I9 Atl.
1013; Lillibridge v. McCann, II7 Mich. 84, 72 Am. St. Rep. 553, 75 N. W.
288.
